The French and the Iraq War
Information for this post was obtained largely from French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing With La Grande Nation by Charles Cogan - an excellent read. Let's concern ourselves with negotiation at the UN Security Council in 2002 and 2003 regarding Iraq.Contrary to popular opinion here in America, Jacques Chirac did not come into office with a strong anti-American reputation. To Cogan, it appears as if his iconic opposition to the Iraq War was primarily political opportunism (as the French public was very anti-war).
The French were instrumental in getting resolution 1441 to pass the Security Council unanimously (15-0). All five permanent members voted for it, while all 10 rotating members voted for it as well. This is significant for two reasons: 1) it was a tough resolution (which is very unusual for the UN) and 2) Syria voted it, primarily because France pressured them. Hailed as a triumph of diplomacy, and proof that the French and the Americans could work together, it simply kicked the problem down the road. The French came away thinking that 1441 said that if Saddam committed a material breach then the Security Council would meet and decide what to do about it, while the Americans and the British came away thinking that 1441 said that if Saddam committed a material breach then any nation would be justified in going to war without a second UN resolution (i.e. the requirement is for the Security Council to meet, not necessarily to authorize war).
When the inspectors went back to Iraq and weapons were not found, and Saddam was passively cooperating (although really he was just stalling for time) - the French concluded that war was not necessary. On January 7th, 2003, Chirac told his military forces to "get into a state of military readiness" - which was widely interpreted as support of the American position. Chirac (and his foreign minister) subsequently overcorrected with their public statements to show their independence. The overcorrection poisoned the political environment between the two countries.
The French realized very late in the game (i.e. January 2003) that we actually meant what we were saying, and that we were going to go to war short of a miracle. They significantly underestimated American resolve, and also the effect of 9/11 on the national psyche. It was at this point that they threated a veto.
Here is the most interesting part: in February 2003 the United States and England introducted a resolution condeming Saddam Hussein for material breach and authorizing war. Although it was the US position that this was not necessary to go to war, Tony Blair badly needed a second resolution for domestic political reasons. The French, who believed that a second resolution was necessary, basically told us that if we were going to go to war then we should withdraw the second resolution because it would be defeated and virtually guarantee that the war would be illegitimate. When we continued to press for a vote, they used their veto as a way to influence other members of the security council (i.e. "hey, we're going to veto it anyway, so how do you want your vote to look given that reality?"). The second resolution was finally withdrawn on March 16, 2003 - which is roughly the time that the war began.
In the past, the French have been given free reign to practice anti-Americanism without consequences. The most important quote, then, of the aftermath of the diplomatic debacle was attributed to Colin Powell, in which he said [paraphrasing] "there will be consequences". This statement apparently rattled the French.
Interestingly, given the passage of time and a more complete understanding of the events leading up to the war, neither the US nor the French seem quite as headstrong or unreasonable as they seemed then. Boiling the whole exchange down to a series of soundbites does not leave the most accurate impression.
posted by JM @ 12:11 PM
<< Home