The Realist Case for Supporting Israel
As a response to recent criticism of America's alliance with Israel, which is widely perceived by those who disagree with it as a pointless exercise in idealism which undercuts American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, Martin Kramer presents the realist case for continued support of Israel. I agree with his main thesis, which is as follows:My answer, to anticipate my conclusion, is this: U.S. support for Israel is not primarily the result of Holocaust guilt or shared democratic values; nor is it produced by the machinations of the "Israel Lobby." American support for Israel--indeed, the illusion of its unconditionality--underpins the Pax Americana in the eastern Mediterranean. It has compelled Israel's key Arab neighbors to reach peace with Israel and to enter the American orbit. The fact that there has not been a general Arab-Israeli war since 1973 is proof that this Pax Americana, based on the U.S.-Israel alliance, has been a success. From a realist point of view, supporting Israel has been a low-cost way of keeping order in part of the Middle East, managed by the United States from offshore and without the commitment of any force. It is, simply, the ideal realist alliance.
In contrast, the problems the United States faces in the Persian Gulf stem from the fact that it does not have an Israel equivalent there, and so it must massively deploy its own force at tremendous cost. Since no one in the Gulf is sure that the United States has the staying power to maintain such a presence over time, the Gulf keeps producing defiers of America, from Khomeini to Saddam to Bin Laden to Ahmadinejad. The United States has to counter them, not in the interests of Israel, but to keep the world's great reserves of oil out of the grip of the West's sworn enemies.
I find pure realism to be naive in a post-9/11 world, so for a convincing case to be made for a controversial policy position that I am strongly in favor to be made from a realist perspective.... well, that is just fantastic and that's why I am posting it here. For clarity, below is Kramer's definition of realism:
Realism, in its policy application, is an approach that seeks to isolate the conduct of foreign affairs from sentimental moral considerations and special interests like ethnic and commercial lobbies, and to base it instead on a pure concept of the national interest. Realists are not interested in historical obligations, or in whether this or that potential ally respects human rights. They see themselves as coldly weighing U.S. interests, winnowing out extraneous considerations, and ending up with policies that look out solely for No. 1: the United States.
Realist thinkers are not isolationists, but they are extremely reluctant to see U.S. power expended on projects and allies that do not directly serve some U.S. interest as they define it--and they define these interests quite narrowly. Generally, they oppose visionary ideas of global transformation, which they see as American empire in disguise. And empire, they believe, is a drain on American resources. They are particularly reluctant to commit American troops, preferring that the United States follow a policy of "offshore balancing" wherever possible--that is, playing rivals off one another.
MILDLY RELATED TANGENT ALERT: These are not just academic discussions. Pure realism is rumored to be rearing its ugly head again in Washington these days, with talk of negotiating with Syria and Iran about Iraq. This would be kind of a cold-blooded power and national interest calculation, which would ignore the fact that the blood-soaked tyrannies in Syria and Iran are the main reasons for the current volatility in the region (i.e. Iraq and Lebanon).
Talking to everyone, including our enemies, sounds wise and level-headed (and to be fair, is not without some merit). However, this type of amoral thinking is one of the main reasons that we are in our current predicament in the Middle East. U.S. support for heartless dictators (Saddam Hussein in the 1980's, for example) over the past 20 years reinforced the notion in the Middle East that America was all about money, power, regional stability, and oil - which was essentially correct from a purely realist perspective. To be fair, these are still our interests - except that we now realize that our cynical embrace of dictators generated short term stability and long term instability (i.e. young and angry populations, willing to listen to radical Islamists, who turn them into suicide bombers, etc...). This is why I am a supporter of democratic realism - meaning that we should only expend blood and treasure in areas where we have a strong national interest at stake, but that the best way to generate long term peace and stability in these areas is the spread of freedom. As unpleasant (and glacially slow) as it is, we have no choice but to try to go after root causes of terrorism.
In defense of U.S. support of dictators in the past, I will say that prior to the end of Cold War we really had no choice but to do what we did. Our goal was the takedown of the Soviet Union, and everything else took a back seat. We took a holidary from history in the 1990's, and that can be excused to an extent as well because everything seemed stable (on the surface), at least until the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 or the USS Cole in 2000. On 9/11, the choices we made back in the 1980's caught up to us. In my mind at least, cold-blooded realism died that day.
The question then becomes - how far should the pendulum swing towards idealism? Did it swing too far in our attempt to democratize Iraq? Is democracy ideal for every oppressed country? Should we try to completely isolate and destabilize Axis of Evil regimes (i.e. idealistic), or should we try to negotiate with them (i.e. realistic)? Finally, the most important question of all - does the U.S. have the willpower to stick with whatever strategy it chooses when the going gets tough?
posted by JM @ 7:05 AM
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