The Party of God
A U.S. journalist
spends some quality time with Hezbollah (hat tip: Tigerhawk). Among the more unexpected items: Hassan Nasrallah is a bore. Perhaps it's corny, but after reading this article I feel supremely blessed to live in a free country.
Meanwhile, the Belmont Club speculates that Hezbollah is
not doing so well on the battlefield, and that Israel is not fighting as ineptly as it seems to be. He argues that Hezbollah's most precious assets are its fighters (trained in Iran, knowledgable of the terrain in southern Lebanon, veterans of years of low-intensity war with Israel), and that Israel taking out Hezbollah guerrillas is a huge strategic victory for Israel (despite the casualties it takes to do so). He also says that Hezbollah is fighting to retain territory, which is the worst thing that a guerrilla army can do. Also, the advance notice given by Israel to villagers in southern Lebanon that they needed to evacuate may have overwhelmed Hezbollah on a humanitarian level - while simultaneously giving warm fuzzies to EU types.
The links pretty much speak for themselves, I don't have much to add.
Advice For Israel
(hat tip: Jay Nordlinger of National Review)
We could have peace in the Middle East if only a few more people would condemn Israel. This satirical article is priceless. The best quote:
Israel is at war and surrounded by millions of people who want them dead,
so what they need most right now is our criticism.
See a more serious article from John Podhoretz on the
paradox of democratic civilized values vs. the realities of war.
Today's Contribution to World Peace
Olivier Guitta at the Counterterrorism Blog notes that Iran was caught
trying to smuggle radioactive material into its country last week:
Agence France Presse reported that Bulgaria had stopped at its border with
Romania a truck filled with radiocative material destined to Iran.
According to Serguei Tstatchev, head of the Bulgarian Nuclear Control Agency,
the truck rented by a British company and Turkish registration was on its way to
Istanbul and then Tehran. It contained radioactive material including
cesium and its radiocative rate was 200 times the normal rate.
In other news, the president of Iran continues to engage in a letter-writing campaign. His
latest penpal? Angela Merkel.
A German government official gave Reuters more details of the letter, on
condition of anonymity.
"It talks about how both Germany and Iran have been
victims of historical developments," he said. "It also says 'we have to find a
solution to the Palestinian problems and Zionism' and so on. It's rather weird,"
he added.
So let's do a quick recap of Iran's (known) activities of the last 2 weeks:
- attempted to smuggle radioactive material into the country from eastern Europe
- instructed its wholly owned subsidiary terror group to attack Israel, sparking a regional conflict
- sent a letter to Germany in which it proposes the resumption of the "final solution" towards Jews after a 60 year hiatus
- suggested on a daily basis that Israel has no right to exist (while simultaneously denying any involvement in the current conflict)
Thanks Iran!
The Return of Total War Theory
Thomas Sowell has an
interesting article up today, which I believe directly ties into my argument that
bringing clarity to the Middle East via democracy is a good thing. He is talking about the fallacies of pacifism:
Take the Middle East. People are calling for a cease-fire in the interests of
peace. But there have been more cease-fires in the Middle East than anywhere
else. If cease-fires actually promoted peace, the Middle East would be the most
peaceful region on the face of the earth instead of the most violent.
Was World War II ended by cease-fires or by annihilating much of Germany
and Japan? Make no mistake about it, innocent civilians died in the process.
Indeed, American prisoners of war died when we bombed Germany.
There is a reason why General Sherman said "war is hell" more than a century ago. But he helped end the Civil War with his devastating march through Georgia -- not by cease fires or bowing to "world opinion" and there were no corrupt busybodies
like the United Nations to demand replacing military force with diplomacy.
There was a time when it would have been suicidal to threaten, much less
attack, a nation with much stronger military power because one of the dangers to
the attacker would be the prospect of being annihilated.
It is worth noting that the Belmont Club has
a similar observation with regards to the distinction between morale bombing and surgical strikes as war-making methodology:
The second thing to remember is that we are now seeing in Lebanon and in the
Global War on Terror in general, a replay of the old argument between precision
strikes and morale bombing. Israel the advocate of the precision strike,
Hezbollah the advocate of morale bombing; recalling that for most of history it
is the morale bombers who have won. It's worth pondering how technology changes
the rules of war.
Commentary:With the exception of Vietnam, morale bombing has proven decisive in all of the major wars of the twentieth century. Ridiculously accurate surgical strikes, and the technology to show videos of them to the world on CNN, create false expectations of zero collateral damage in war. The UN and various pacifist organizations create an environment in which aggression is not truly punished (i.e. by annihilation of the aggressor country) and therefore deterred. This is a political tinderbox. Exhibits A and B are Iraq, and Israel's current war on Hezbollah.
How does this tie into my idea about democracy and clarity? In the current prototypical Middle Eastern autocracy, the regime and the people can legitimely be seen as two separate entities because the regime is not derived from the will of the people. If a bad regime (Saddam Hussein, for example) does bad things, and the US has to correct the problem - it is forced to attempt to topple the regime while not harming the people. The people have nothing to do with the dictator, for the most part. As such, our military faces an almost impossible task - how to topple a regime while inflicting as little damage as possible on the civilian population (and infrastructure, etc...)? Thus the "surgical strike" monster from the blogs referenced above comes to life, and our probability of decisive victory drops accordingly.
With democratic clarity, a total war can be fought and won against our enemies. If the Arab people want to elect terrorists to lead them, they can - but it will not be without severe costs. Sure it sounds bloodthirsty, but let's not forget that WW2 cost about 50 million lives around the world, and no one is arguing that beating fascism was a waste of time or resources. It is perhaps the crowning achievement of civilization in the 20th century.
Who knows - perhaps we fight a total war or two against our enemies, and our other enemies will think twice before misbehaving?
Playing the Game
After being told for years that occupation of Arab lands is the source of the conflict in the Middle East, Israel unilaterally pulls out of Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005. As soon as they left, the areas they formerly occupied became armed camps dedicated solely to the destruction of Israel. The attacks on Jewish towns continued, and thus Israeli (at a heavy price) was able to say to the world - "hey, we tried it your way and it didn't work". The Israelis gave peace a chance, and it failed - because their enemies are not interested in peace. Thus the current war is legitimate. Contrary to the headlines, Israel has received far more credit than they usually get when they defend themselves. Charles Krauthammer
observes:
Every important party in the region and in the world, except the radical
Islamists in Tehran and their clients in Damascus, wants Hezbollah disarmed and
removed from south Lebanon so that it is no longer able to destabilize the peace
of both Lebanon and the broader Middle East.
Which parties? Start with the great powers. In September 2004 they passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, demanding that Hezbollah disarm and allow the Lebanese army to take back control of south Lebanon.
The other Arabs have spoken, too. In a stunning development, the 22-member Arab League criticized Hezbollah for provoking the current crisis. It is unprecedented for the Arab League to criticize any Arab party while it is actively engaged in hostilities with Israel.
But the Arab states know that Hezbollah, a Shiite militia in the service
of Persian Iran, is a threat not just to Lebanon but to them as well. Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan have openly criticized Hezbollah for starting a war on
what is essentially Iran's timetable (to distract attention from Iran's pending
referral to the Security Council for sanctions over its nuclear program). They
are far more worried about Iran and its proxies than about Israel. They are
therefore eager to see Hezbollah disarmed and defanged.
Despite all the hype, I believe that this strategy worked well for the Israelis because both potential post-withdrawal scenarios worked well for them. If the Arabs were being truthful about "land for peace", then the attacks would stop once they were given land. If they were not being truthful, then warring against them (especially when they begin the war with such naked aggression that even Kofi Annan cannot ignore it) looks a lot more legitimate, which is crucial politically.
Here's the main point - I think that George W. Bush's strategy all along with Iran has been to "play the game" like Israel did with the Arabs. Bush has let the EU-3 try to negotiate with Iran, knowing that they would fail miserably - which they have. Bush is determined not to be brutalized over a war again like he was with Iraq - so he is going to wait until all options have fully exhausted themselves. When war comes - and it will - Bush can say that the US "played the game". As with Israel, you will hear a lot of condemnation - but it will be significantly less than what was heard
vis a vis Iraq. Bloggers like myself will be the ones pointing that out, of course. Bush's strategy is wise, but not without risks - who knows what Iran is capable of before that tipping point is reached in which war becomes legitimate?
Haloscan commenting and trackback have been added to this blog.
Update: Apparently all previous comments have been lost due to this conversion. Sorry about that, but hopefully the site will be improved.
Trouble Between Turkey and Iraq?
As if there weren't enough chaos in the Middle East,
tensions are rising between Turkey and Iraq. The PKK, a Kurdish terrorist group operating out of northern Iraq, is using Iraq as a base to attack Turkey. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross at the Counterterrorism Blog says that:
the Turkish government recently summoned both the U.S. and Iraqi ambassadors to warn that Turkish patience with continued PKK presence in Iraq was wearing thin.
Turkey said that if the U.S. and Iraq do not take "necessary steps," Turkey
could launch a "cross-border operation." Turkey has suggested that if it's
unsatisfied with the steps that the U.S. and Iraq take, it could launch this
operation unilaterally: "Our patience is not endless. Root out Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) guerillas immediately, otherwise, we will be forced to resort to our
right of self-defense.
The flashpoint?
an incident last week in which fifteen soldiers, police and guards were killed
by PKK guerillas in a clash in Southeast Turkey. This is just the last in a long
string of incidents that has occurred over the last couple of years, but the
death of these fifteen was particularly disturbing to the Turks. It has been the
lead item in Turkish newscasts.
The danger?
There are two potential dangers to Turkish intervention in Iraq. The first is
that Turkish units may end up clashing with American-backed Kurdish units (i.e.
units in the Kurdish areas that aren't affiliated with the PKK). The second
danger is that a Turkish unit may accidentally engage Americans in a firefight.
What an absolute mess. One senses, though, that the Turks have a valid point. Unfortunately, we are in the middle of fighting a
proxy war with Syria and Iran in Iraq right now, and stirring up a hornets' nest in the peaceful Kurdish north is not high on our priority list.
The Democracy Debate, Continued
Tigerhawk has an
excellent post (albeit lengthy) on the debate over whether democracy in the Middle East would reduce or eliminate terrorism. His point essentially is that democracy will not end anti-American or anti-Israeli sentiment. Instead, it will give average people an incentive to fight against radical Islamists. It will create, as in Iraq currently, thousands and thousands of anti-Islamists. These people will not necessarily be pro-American or pro-Israel, or pro-western in general - but they will be an enemy of our enemy, and thus our friends.
In other words, democracy will give average citizens a third choice - because right now all they have to choose from is radical Islam or crazy tyrannical regimes. To most in the Middle East, this is not much of a choice at all - and so they just keep their head down. The regimes oppress the people, and the radical Islamists have an entire population which looks the other way when they are planning and committing terror attacks.
I agree with the post almost entirely, but I want to take (slight) issue on two fronts.
1) I would not be so quick to discredit the Bush Administration's idea of "draining the swamp." Islamic terror that threatens the US can be reduced to a simple formula:
anger at tyrannical regimes + radical interpretation of Islam = Islamic terrorism
I believe that democracy idea is taking broad aim at the first part of this equation, and will ultimately be successful (although it will admittedly take a lot of time). These clown regimes, to borrow Tigerhawk's phrase, create legions of angry unemployed people with no hope for the future - this is a fertile breeding ground for the radical Islamists (second part of the equation). Tamp down the anger (through free expression, etc...) and who is going to volunteer to be a suicide bomber? Tamp down the anger, and the radical Islamists in the back of the mosque may be not a whole lot different from the types who want to form militias in the United States, or the KKK, or EarthFirst. Tamp down the anger, and suddenly Tigerhawk's thesis works - because people will have a say (and a stake) in their government.
Now, the radical interpretation of Islam - I think that is here to stay - not at all sure we can defeat that or that we even have any idea how to defeat that. Tigerhawk is right when he says that this is best left to the Arab world.
2) The argument (made by Andy McCarthy from National Review and referenced in Tigerhawk's post) that bringing democracy to the Middle East is a failure because it empowers anti-American regimes is not as clear-cut as it sounds. Democracy brings clarity to a muddled region, and I think that's a good thing.
Let's let the people speak! If the Palestinian people truly want a terrorist government, why not let them have it, and then they can deal with all of the repercussions? They elected Hamas, and suddenly the aid stopped flowing, and they started to starve. Maybe that will teach them a lesson. Maybe it brought some truth to the negotiating process. No matter what Arafat said for all of those years, the
people did not have any interest in negotiating - they wanted the death of Israel and they just elected a government that proved it. Great - now Israel and America can act accordingly.
If the Lebanese people want to elect Hezbollah, an Islamic militia armed and controlled by Iran, great! They can deal with the consequences when Hezbollah causes trouble, and maybe that will teach them a lesson. Democracy ends the divide between people and government, and thus the peoples' votes have consequences - and they will have to keep that in mind when voting in the future.
As anyone in the State Department would probably tell you, it is extraordinarily difficult to deal with a regime that is fearful of its own people and has no idea what they really want - said regime has to operate extremely conservatively to avoid revolution - and said regime will attempt to deflect all criticism and anger from its citizens towards America and Israel. This is an inherently unstable situation, no matter what the realists will tell you - and it has failed, spectacularly and repeatedly, which is why we're even debating democracy.
Put more simply - how would a region full of democratically elected anti-American governments be any worse than a region full of illegimate governments full of anti-American populations which are breeding grounds for terror? We pretend that the dictators are our friends, but they are not - so what's the difference?
Threads of Chaos
Let's review the various threads of global instability which have emerged recently:
1) Mumbai - multiple bombings left approximately 200 dead and hundreds more wounded; likely culprit was a jihadist group operating out of Pakistan, with help from
Dawood Ibrahim (India's version of Osama bin Laden and Al Capone merged as one)
2) Per wretchard at The Belmont Club and Michael Yon (
The Belmont Club: The Curse of Freedom), Afghanistan is swiftly becoming a corrupt narco-state that is on its way down (as opposed to Iraq, which Michael Yon says is on its way up). See Yon's post
here - it's a must-read.
3) Israel launched retaliatory invasions of Gaza and Lebanon due to the abduction of several of its soldiers; culprits are Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon
4) Islamists took over Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and are imposing Taliban-style rule; the fear is that Somalia could become the next pre-9/11 Afghanistan
5) The U.S. Supreme Court ratified a treaty with Al Qaeda (the
Hamdan case)
6) North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan; Japan is reportedly reviewing its Constitution to see whether pre-emptive strikes on North Korea would be legal
Items 1 - 5 share a common thread - militant Islam. Of particular interest is the fact that items 1 and 2 can be directly blamed on Pakistan. The Waziristan region of Pakistan is among the most lawless in the world, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban operate openly there. If you read about any major international terror plot, either successful or disrupted, a Pakistani connection is virtually guaranteed. Either phone calls are traced to Pakistan, or the terrorists trained there recently, or the terrorists were about to go there when we caught them, etc... The bottom line is that those who believe that
militant Islam is a myth or that it can be easily ignored need to wake up.
Item 6 can most likely be traced to the Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the Bush Administration, which has significantly turned up the heat on North Korea by attacking the money laundering, drug smuggling, and counterfeiting operations which keep the regime in power. Eyeing Iran wishfully, where American and European negotiatiors are poised to yield to nuclear blackmail, North Korea decided to do a little saber-rattling of its own. After all, it needs concessions from the west as well.
Not a good time for global peace and stability right now. Enjoy the links - esp. Michael Yon's.
A Wake-up Call
Happy Independence Day, and may the piece below prove as inspiring to you as it does to me.
The Anxiety of Influence How well does today's America measure up to its past?BY JOSIAH BUNTING III Tuesday, July 4, 2006 12:01 a.m. EDT
More than 40 years ago the historian Henry Steele Commager asked how it was that the British colonies in North America could have produced such a galaxy of leaders: a generation that made a revolution and established a new and enduring nation. In talent, he argued, the leadership rivaled that of the Athens of Pericles and the England of Elizabeth I, a florescence of wisdom, character, virtue and vision that has not since been equaled. The question has never been--and never will be--satisfactorily answered; each generation is obliged to engage it in its own way.
Commager adduced several reasons, most of them familiar: "New occasions teach new duties," as James Russell Lowell wrote. Great challenge evokes mighty response. The places of honor, of ambition realized, were almost all to be found in the ranks of those preparing the Revolution or fighting in the continental army or designing, and making, a new government. There were few fortunes to be made, few industries, universities, institutions of culture to lead. And talent seemed much less divisible than in 20th-century America; that is, of necessity a new beau ideal of leadership had come into being: The patriot saw no necessary tension between being a scholar, soldier, writer, legislator, leader.
Like the heroes of the early Roman Republic and ancient Greece (Rome more than Greece) whom they emulated, these Americans discharged their obligations, as they understood them, by answering multiple vocations and duties, all serving a common end. They did not particularly count the cost. They were not concerned to lay up fortunes for themselves. They had small conception of what our own age calls (and is obsessed by) "stress." They were educated in the classics of ancient literature, history particularly, and in the philosophical literature of 17th- and 18th-century Europe--Locke, Sidney, Montesquieu, Hume. Many did not attend college: There were only nine universities and colleges by the end of 1776.
Yet they wrote with a grace and lucidity we cannot match. Their minds seemed clearer than ours. And they had also what was imputed to a great general of a later generation: the imaginations of engineers. They knew how to transform ideas into action, into policies and institutions.
When they were young, these leaders of the revolutionary generation accustomed themselves, under the supervision of demanding adults, to long periods of solitary study. Their English near-contemporary, William Wordsworth, remembered a statue of Isaac Newton in the courtyard of his Cambridge college: "the marbled index of a mind voyaging forever, through strange seas of thought, alone." As young people, they were not often praised or rewarded. The satisfactions of learning, they were taught, were in the learning, and in how that learning--like the unconscious predisposition to emulate certain heroes--might somehow be transmuted into examples and lessons that would influence their own conduct later on. Like Pericles' men of Athens, they would thereafter "be ashamed to fall below a certain standard."
The English historian Paul Johnson wrote that the generation of American leaders of the 1940s was our ablest since that of the Founding. No one imputes to this second generation the creative genius of the first. Several of its tribunes were professional soldiers and naval officers--men ideally (according to Clausewitz) of a searching rather than a creative intellect. One has the impression, studying their lives as youngsters, that they were not "brilliant" at school.
They were born between 1875 and 1890: they included FDR, Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Ernest King, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman, Omar Bradley, William Halsey, Chester Nimitz. With the exceptions of MacArthur and Roosevelt, they were children of the American heartland, all born into modest, even hardscrabble circumstances. The service academies were literally their way out of Dodge.
For the military men, Marshall and MacArthur in particular, enormous responsibility was given them as lieutenants in their early 20s in the Philippines. Self-reliance is usually the consequence, and so is what David Riesman called, in 1950, "inner-directedness": the predisposition to act on judgment and conscience rather than calculations of external approval. Thus Harry Truman, almost blind without glasses, insisted on leading his artillery battery in the most severe, and final, campaign of the Great War--the Meuse Argonne offensive (in which American casualties were 126,000, including 26,000 killed, in six weeks). More than 20 years later, Truman, then a U.S. senator, sought service again, but George Marshall turned him down: Truman was then in his mid-50s.
Nimitz, Bradley, Eisenhower--towers of moral strength, settled wisdom, common sense of an elemental, singularly American kind: and all, like the 16 millions who served in World War II (more than 10% of the country's 1945 population) with the innate modesty which remains above all others the quality which draws Americans of 2006 to this Greatest Generation. Such people embodied the virtues, including the un-self-conscious nobility the founding generation admired in their ancient models.
In a phrase that recurs so often that it has almost become a cliché, we read that Bradley, or Ike, or Halsey, "was a mediocre student at the Academy." Yet, in a confluence of character, conscience and mind that we cannot disentangle, they considered problems of enormous complexity, took counsel of those they admired, attained wise and useful decisions, and inspired and led huge numbers of servicemen--and women--to complete their missions. In our time of crisis will another generation bring forward men and women of the same métier as those of the Revolutionary and Second World Wars?
The answer expected is a red-blooded
Of Course We Will! To suggest anything less is to invite the imputation of cynicism. But the culture of palliatives--in which virtually all minor encumbrances of imperfect health, physical and psychological, can be erased by drugs, in which most avenues of advancement rely less on the actions of self-reliance than upon the legions of aids (human and material) that are gathered to smooth their way, and in which the ends to be pursued and the ambitions to be gratified are usually (though not always) those that exclude useful service to the nation--this is not a culture that cultivates the qualities most needed.
Consider the character of George Marshall, leader of the American Army from 1939 to 1945, whose name, President Truman insisted, be given the Plan for European Recovery in 1947. A small episode, early in Marshall's final retirement, is illustrative. He was offered very large sums of money to write his memoirs. He declined instantly. It would not do to call attention to himself. His country, he said, had already compensated him for his service--and besides, what he would be obliged to write, writing truthfully and accurately, might cause pain to people who had done their best, and who deserved well of their country.
Gen. Bunting, a former superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, is president of the H.F. Guggenheim Foundation.
The French and the Iraq War
Information for this post was obtained largely from
French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing With La Grande Nation by Charles Cogan - an excellent read. Let's concern ourselves with negotiation at the UN Security Council in 2002 and 2003 regarding Iraq.
Contrary to popular opinion here in America, Jacques Chirac did not come into office with a strong anti-American reputation. To Cogan, it appears as if his iconic opposition to the Iraq War was primarily political opportunism (as the French public was very anti-war).
The French were instrumental in getting resolution 1441 to pass the Security Council unanimously (15-0). All five permanent members voted for it, while all 10 rotating members voted for it as well. This is significant for two reasons: 1) it was a tough resolution (which is very unusual for the UN) and 2) Syria voted it, primarily because France pressured them. Hailed as a triumph of diplomacy, and proof that the French and the Americans could work together, it simply kicked the problem down the road. The French came away thinking that 1441 said that if Saddam committed a material breach then the Security Council would meet and decide what to do about it, while the Americans and the British came away thinking that 1441 said that if Saddam committed a material breach then any nation would be justified in going to war without a second UN resolution (i.e. the requirement is for the Security Council to meet, not necessarily to authorize war).
When the inspectors went back to Iraq and weapons were not found, and Saddam was passively cooperating (although really he was just stalling for time) - the French concluded that war was not necessary. On January 7th, 2003, Chirac told his military forces to "get into a state of military readiness" - which was widely interpreted as support of the American position. Chirac (and his foreign minister) subsequently overcorrected with their public statements to show their independence. The overcorrection poisoned the political environment between the two countries.
The French realized very late in the game (i.e. January 2003) that we actually meant what we were saying, and that we were going to go to war short of a miracle. They significantly underestimated American resolve, and also the effect of 9/11 on the national psyche. It was at this point that they threated a veto.
Here is the most interesting part: in February 2003 the United States and England introducted a resolution condeming Saddam Hussein for material breach and authorizing war. Although it was the US position that this was not necessary to go to war, Tony Blair badly needed a second resolution for domestic political reasons. The French, who believed that a second resolution was necessary, basically told us that if we were going to go to war then we should withdraw the second resolution because it would be defeated and virtually guarantee that the war would be illegitimate. When we continued to press for a vote, they used their veto as a way to influence other members of the security council (i.e. "hey, we're going to veto it anyway, so how do you want your vote to look given that reality?"). The second resolution was finally withdrawn on March 16, 2003 - which is roughly the time that the war began.
In the past, the French have been given free reign to practice anti-Americanism without consequences. The most important quote, then, of the aftermath of the diplomatic debacle was attributed to Colin Powell, in which he said [paraphrasing] "there will be consequences". This statement apparently rattled the French.
Interestingly, given the passage of time and a more complete understanding of the events leading up to the war, neither the US nor the French seem quite as headstrong or unreasonable as they seemed then. Boiling the whole exchange down to a series of soundbites does not leave the most accurate impression.
Elite Gaullist Culture
I've recently been reading
a book entitled
French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with La Grande Nation by Charles Cogan - it comes with the highest recommendations for anyone interested in how the elite of French society are developed and what motivates them. A summary of some of the high points follows (with a separate post to come on French actions in the UN Security Council negotiations prior to the Iraq War).
The Cultural Context- Tradition of the State - in France the State is virtually deified. To work for the government is seen as noble and prestigious, a higher calling than perhaps any other profession. The trappings of office, the perks, and the general grandeur government buildings and functions is unparallelled in the western world. The State has survived every convulsion in France since the Revolution of 1789, and even the Revolution did not come to destroy the State - it came only to change it. Needless to say, this is quite different from the United States - where in Jefferson's words "the government that governs best governs least" - and the State is not viewed favorably
- Conception of Democracy - to the French, democracy entails invididualism only within the context of "the greater good". The French approach (liberality, equality, fraternity) essentially says that there is more than individualism for a society - thus a top-down spirit is born in which French society is highly regulated (which translates to a powerful State apparatus) - and through the law the French citizen is forced to correct the civic deficit that is perhaps in a free society. In contrast, the American approach (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) stresses individualism - and the law ensures only that citizens have a right to pursue happiness on their own terms. There are no guarantees here. The approach is more bottom-up, where the collection of all individual wills essentially equals societal will, with minimal government interference.
- The Strong Executive - in France the President is much more powerful than in America. The legislature holds significant power, but the President has the upper hand. Both the executive and legislative branches are more powerful than the legislative branch. The executive branch is extremely hierarchical, and thus the President at the top of the pyramid speaks for France in totality. The French will iron out their differences behind closed doors and present a 100% unified front to the world - and typically the final position is the President's. In contrast, the President in America is heavily constrained by the legislative and judicial branches. Also, America sends divided messages to the rest of the world about the "American position" due to highly visible political disagreements, endless leaks, and bureaucratic infighting.
- Anticapitalism - the French believe in strong state intervention to correct the social and economic inequalities which flow from capitalism. Thus, their society is socialist.
- Freedom From Religion - the Revolution of 1789 made the French the first European state to de-Christianize itself, and it has stayed true to that idea ever since. The French do not espouse freedom of religion - instead they would rather be free from it altogether.
- Anti-Americanism - primarily due to the fact that the French and American political and economic systems are seen by their adherents as universal. As such, they represent two powerful (and sharply different) worldviews which are in constant competition for global supremacy. French insecurity about its waning power in the world, coupled with a fear of excessive American power and an uneasiness with being dependent on the US for military protection all contribute strongly to anti-Americanism as well.
- Panache - the French style tends towards audacity and elegance. High praise is reserved for those who show a sharp wit in conversation, and present arguments in a dashing and impressive manner. In the context of negotiations, this can be highly irritating to representatives of other countries.
- Rationalism - the French bring a Cartesian style of argumentation to the negotiation table. I will oversimplify for the sake of brevity - the Cartesian style is named for Rene Descartes and entails an almost religious devotion to logic and reason. The French have to fit their stances on various issues within a broad ideological framework before they can get to details, and if their opinion is backed by strong logic (to them) then they will not bend on it. In contrast, Americans are more pragmatic - typically working out the details first and moving upward from there.
- Education of the Elites - suffice it to say that the French have a large, focused, and disciplined system of higher education by which the State maintains an elite class which will perpetuate it. The best analogy I could make would be if all of the Ivy League schools in this country produced nothing but civil servants and military officers every year. Oh, and the entrance requirements would have to be such that, if you were not pre-selected several years before graduation to move on to the Ivy League school (and thus received years of specialized training) then you would have virtually no chance of admittance. It is certainly tough to get into our elite schools in America, but in France it is taken to a higher level.
The book is fascinating and goes into much more detail on each of the bullet points above. In addition, the French historical context is fascinating, as well as details of their actual negotiating behavior.
Iraq as the Spanish Civil War
The Belmont Club: A Modern Homage to CataloniaAs you can see via the link above, wretchard at the Belmont Club has an interesting take on Iraq's current situation:
to those who argue that Iraq is on the verge of civil war, perhaps the most
accurate comparison is with the Spanish Civil War, in which a global conflict
played itself out in miniature within a single country. It is in effect, a
cockpit in which global opponents are fighting through Iraqi proxies.
This is highly perceptive. It's ironic in the sense that civil war has not broken out in Iraq, and yet the intensity level is so high on the part of the global and regional players fighting through Iraqi proxies that the Spanish Civil War model probably does fit the best. Put in this perspective, it is much easier to understand why things are still messy over there after 3+ years of US presence. I believe that the main (not the only) reason that Afghanistan is as calm as it is compared to Iraq is that its population has been broken by 3 straight decades of warfare. Iraq, on the other hand, was an absolute tinderbox waiting to explode. They are not weary, they are not tired, I think that they are just getting warmed up. Scores are still being settled daily, wrongs are being avenged, and it's ugly. The crazy thing is -
it's not about us. The media makes it seem like it is, but I think much of the violence has nothing to do with our presence there.
A question - who will be our Orwell this time around? You may remember that his "Homage to Catalonia" chronicled his experiences in the Spanish Civil War, when he fought for the communist side but quickly became disillusioned with them. This generation's Orwell will be found on the blogosphere.
Another question - are there terrible things on the horizon which will make us forget about Iraq? In 1936 the Spanish Civil War raged, but in a few short years Hitler would take over Europe and start WW2. Importantly, the players on both sides in WW2 were almost identical to the players in the (proxy) Spanish Civil War. War with Iran would complete the analogy - let us hope it doesn't come to pass.
